Introduction
In his book "The Alchemy of Finance", George Soros (1987) introduced the principles of fallibility and reflexivity to describe the evolving state of financial markets and the economy. As a very successful market participant Soros argued that standard economic theory built on the paradigm of rationality is a poor description of economic reality and has been of little help to guide investment behavior. Soros articulated the crucial role of expectations and feedback in the economy and the lack of a realistic description of these phenomena by the rational expectations paradigm. Soros' view has been updated and described elegantly in his recent contribution Soros (2013) to this special issue. Here we discuss the relation between economic theory, especially the role of expectations and learning, and Soros' principles of fallibility and reflexivity emphasizing empirical and laboratory evidence.
Let me start by recalling the two principles fallibility and reflexivity and their central role in social science and economics in his own words (Soros, 2013) : "The first is that in situations that have thinking participants, the participants view of the world never perfectly corresponds to the actual state of affairs. · · · The second proposition is that these imperfect views can influence the situation to which they relate through the behavior of the participants · · · it connects the universe of thoughts with the universe of events. · · · Reflexive feedback loops between the cognitive and manipulative functions connect the realms of beliefs and events. The participants views influence but do not determine the course of events, and the course of events influences but does not determine the participants views. The influence is continuous and circular; that is what turns it into a feedback loop." rational expectations. Muth was well aware that aggregation of individual expectations into a representative rational forecast depends critically on whether or not these individual expectations are correlated (Muth, 1961 , p.321, emphasis added):
"Allowing for cross-sectional differences in expectations is a simple matter, because their aggregate affect is negligible as long as the deviation from the rational forecast for an individual firm is not strongly correlated with those of the others. Modifications are necessary only if the correlation of the errors is large and depends systematically on other explanatory variables".
Who is right, Soros or Muth? I will review some recent theory, empirical evidence and laboratory experiments that shed some light on this debate.
Expectations Feedback & Bounded Rationality
Soros recognizes the crucial difference between natural and social sciences: in social systems participants can think and affect actual events. Weather forecasts will not affect the probability of rain, but a forecast of the macroeconomic outlook by the president of the ECB may affect the likelihood of a recession. A dynamic economic model is an expectations feedback system, mapping individual beliefs into actions and market realizations, shaping new market expectations, etc. A simple form of an expectations feedback system is
where today's realized market price p t depends on the individual forecasts p e j,t+1 for tomorrow of all economic agents.
Traditional economics is built on the paradigm of rational expectations (RE) introduced by Muth (1961) and popularized in macroeconomics by Lucas and Prescott (1971) and others. All agents are assumed to be perfectly rational using economic theory to form their expectations. All subjective beliefs then coincide with objective model consistent expectations, and the model can be solved for rational expectations equilibrium (REE), which is essentially a fixed point of the expectations feedback system. An important motivation contributing to the popularity of RE has been the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976) , that policy conclusions based on non-RE models are potentially misleading, because changes in policy will alter individual behavior. In particular, expectations should not depend on exogenous parameters, but should take policy changes into account.
Many economists today are well aware that RE imposes unrealistically high cognitive and informational assumptions on the agents in the economy and that some form of bounded rationality is needed. But which form? RE disciplines economic modeling in an elegant and convenient way. By imposing RE, all parameters of individual forecasting are removed from the model. Allowing for non-rational expectations begs the question which errors the model should allow for. This leads to Sims' metaphor of the "wilderness of bounded rationality": if agents are non-rational, there are a million ways of how individual agents may make mistakes.
One alternative approach to bounded rationality that is gaining some ground in macroeconomics is adaptive learning. Boundedly rational agents do not have perfect knowledge about the economy, but act as econometricians or statisticians using an econometric forecasting model and updating the parameters over time as additional observations become available; see, e.g., Sargent (1993) and Honkapohja (2001, 2013) for extensive surveys and references. The original motivation for this literature has been to study conditions under which learning converges to the RE, in the hope that learning may enforce RE without assuming perfect knowledge of the expectations feedback system. Agents are then assumed to know the structural equations of the economy, but not the parameters which need to be learned over time as additional observations become available. Many examples, however, have been provided where learning does not settle down to RE, but to non-rational equilibria, explaining high persistence and excess volatility, as, e.g., in the learning equilibria in Bullard (1994) or the self-fulfilling mistakes in Grandmont (1998) Another complementary approach to bounded rationality are heterogeneous expectations models as e.g. introduced in Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998 ) and Branch and Evans (2006) . Agents endogenously switch between different forecasting rules, ranging from simple heuristics to more sophisticated strategies, based upon their relative performance. Notice that in both adaptive learning and heterogeneous switching models, the learning is endogenous and agents will adapt to policy changes, so that these models, at least to a first order approximation, mitigate the Lucas critique.
These recent approaches are much in the spirit of Soros' principles of fallibility and reflexivity. Agents do not know the correct model of the economy, but rather use some misspecified forecasting rules which may be heterogeneous across agents. This leads to a complex economic expectations feedback system. A REE may arise as a special case in which the equilibrium is exactly self-fulfilling, but often almost self-fulfilling behavioral learning equilibria will arise exhibiting excess volatility and deviating persistently from the rational benchmark. In what follows we will discuss the empirical relevance of almost self-fulfilling equilibria.
A behavioral asset pricing model
We consider a stylized asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs, as in Brock and Hommes (1998), and fit a 2-type model to S&P500 data. Investors can choose between a risk free asset paying a fixed return r and a risky asset (say a stock) paying uncertain dividends. Assume that investors have perfect knowledge of the exogenous cash flow process, and thus know the 'fundamental value' of the risky asset, but differ in their beliefs about the future price of the asset . Denote Y t as the dividend payoff and P t as the asset price. The market clearing pricing equation is given by:
whereĒ t [.] denote average expectations of the population of investors.
The dividend process follows a geometric random walk with drift:
Investors are assumed to have correct, model-consistent beliefs about the exogenous dividend process,
ν is the constant growth rate of dividends. This assumption has the convenient feature that the model can be written in deviations from a RE benchmark fundamental.
In the special case where all agents have rational expectations about prices, the price equals its RE fundamental value given by the discounted sum of all future expected dividends 1 :
Hence, under RE the price-to-dividend ratio is constant and given by In deviations from the fundamental value x t ≡ δ t − δ * , the 2-type model is given by:
The asset pricing model has positive expectations feedback, that is, realized price deviation increases (decreases) when (average) expected deviation increases (decreases).
Consider the simplest form of heterogeneity with belief types which are linear in the last observation:
Two types, h = 1, 2, are sufficient to capture the essential difference in agents' behavior: fundamentalists believe the price will return to its fundamental value (0 ≤ φ 1 < 1)
and chartists believe that the price (in the short run) will move away from the fundamental value (φ 2 > 1).
The fractions of the two types are updated with a multi-nomial logit model based on their relative performance, as in Brock and Hommes (1997) , with the intensity of choice β measuring how quickly agents switch strategies:
The performance measure U h,t is a weighted average of past profits and past fitness, with memory parameter ω:
Hence, consistent with empirical observations, agents tend to switch to strategies that generated higher profits in the recent past.
The econometric form of the endogenous switching model is an AR(1)-model with a time-varying coefficient:
where t represents an IID error term. The estimated parameter values in Hommes and in't Veld (2013) are: • φ 1 = 0.953: type 1 therefore are fundamentalists, expecting (slow) mean reversion of the price towards its fundamental value;
• φ 2 = 1.035: type 2 are trend-extrapolators, expecting the price deviation from fundamental to increase by 3.5% per quarter;
• ω = 0.816: implying almost 20% weight is given to the most recent profit observation and about 80% to past profitability.
Define the market sentiment as In this behavioral asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs, agents switch endogenously between a mean-reversion and a trend-following strategy based upon realized profitability and aggregate behavior is very different from the rational benchmark. Strategy switching driven by (short run) profitability leads to an almost selffulfilling equilibrium with endogenously generated bubbles triggered by shocks to fundamentals ("news") and fueled by positive feedback from trend-followers and market crashes reenforced by negative feedback from fundamentalists. 
wherep e t+1 = ( 6 h=1 p e h,t+1 )/6 is the average two-period ahead price forecast, p f =ȳ/r is the fundamental price, and ε t are small shocks. Subjects do not know the underlying law of motion (11), but they do know the mean-dividendȳ and the interest rate r, so they could use these to compute the fundamental price and use it in their forecast. The fraction n t in (11) is the share of computerized fundamental robot traders, increasing as the price moves away from the fundamental benchmark according to The fundamental trader thus acts as a "far from equilibrium" stabilizing force in the market, adding negative feedback when the asset price becomes overvalued. The negative feedback becomes stronger the more price moves away from fundamental.
The overall expectations feedback system (11) has positive feedback, but the positive feedback becomes less strong (i.e. stronger mean-reverting) when price moves away from fundamental value. A second striking result is that in all groups participants were able to coordinate their forecasts. The forecasts, as shown in the lower parts of the panels, are dispersed in the first periods but then, within 3-5 periods, move close to each other. The coordination of individual forecasts has been achieved in the absence of any communication between subjects, other than through the realized market price, and without any knowledge of past and present predictions of other participants.
The fourth group in Fig. 2 shows a time series of prices, in a market without fundamental traders (Hommes et al., 2008) . In the absence of a far from equilibrium stabilizing force due to negative feedback from the fundamental robot traders, a longlasting asset price bubble occurs with asset prices rising above 900, i.e. more than 15 times the fundamental price, before reaching an exogenously imposed upper-bound of 1000 and a subsequent market crash.
These asset market laboratory experiments exhibit a strong degree of reflexivity.
Markets do not converge to the perfectly self-fulfilling RE fundamental 60, but rather fluctuate persistently and exhibit expectations driven bubbles and crashes along almost self-fulfilling equilibria.
Positive versus negative feedback experiments
The asset pricing experiments are characterized by positive expectations feedback, that is, an increase of the average forecast or an individual forecast causes the realized market price to rise. Heemeijer et al. (2009) where t is a small random shock to the pricing rule. The positive and negative feedback systems (13) and (14) have the same unique RE equilibrium steady state 
A theory of heterogeneous expectations
The fact that qualitatively different aggregate outcomes arise suggests that heterogeneous expectations must play a key role to explain these experimental data. Anufriev 
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were p The fractions of the four forecasting heuristics evolve according to a discrete choice model with asynchronous updating:
The fitness or performance measure of forecasting heuristic i is based upon quadratic forecasting errors, consistent with the earnings in the experiments:
where η ∈ [0, 1] measures the strength of the agents' memory. In the special case δ = 0, (19) reduces to the the discrete choice model with synchronous updating; δ represents inertia in switching as subjects change strategies only occasionally. The parameter β ≥ 0 represents the intensity of choice measuring how sensitive individuals are to differences in strategy performance 3 . . Two top panels correspond to three groups with robot traders; two bottom panels correspond to group without robot trader and large bubble (left panels) and negative and positive feedback groups. In the negative feedback market the adaptive expectations (ADA) rule dominates and enforces quick convergence to the RE fundamental price 60. In the positive expectations feedback market, the strong (STR) and the weak (WTR) trend following rules perform well and reinforce price oscillations. In all positive feedback groups individual expectations coordinate on a non-RE almost self-fulfilling equilibrium. 
Conclusions
The main conclusion to be drawn from the theoretical, empirical and experimental work discussed below may be formulated as follows. In positive feedback markets aggregate behavior is not well described by perfectly self-fulfilling rational expectations equilibrium. Instead, under positive feedback individuals tend to coordinate their expectations on almost self-fulfilling equilibria, very different from the exact rational self-fulfilling equilibria, and characterized by excess volatility and persistent price fluctuations.
The main finding, consistent with Soros principles of fallibility and reflexivity, is that under positive expectations feedback almost self-fulfilling equilibria provide a much better fit to individual and aggregate behavior in lab experiments and empirical data than the perfectly self-fulfilling REE in traditional models. Parsimony is an important and attractive feature as simplicity makes coordination on an almost self-fulfilling equilibrium more likely as a description of aggregate behavior. Agents make mistakes, as their belief is only an approximation of complex reality. But in equilibrium, the mistake becomes self-fulfilling and it is not easy for agents to improve upon their individual forecasting.
Macroeconomics assigns a central role for expectations in economic modeling. For example, in his standard work on monetary policy in modern New Keynesian macro, Woodford (2003) emphasizes the key role of "managing expectations" for monetary policy. Policy analysis should focus more on managing almost self-fulfilling equilibria.
The bounded rationality models discussed here, at least to a first order approximation, take into account the Lucas critique, as expectations and learning will adapt to policy changes. Economic policy analysis may benefit enormously by focussing on efficiency and welfare gains in correcting mispricing of almost self-fulfilling equilibria.
Mapping F is nonlinear complex system and/of agent-based model.
